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Euro-sceptics in Power 
Integration-critical Parties in the European Parliament and National Governments 
Nicolai von Ondarza 
Following a string of crises that have eroded trust in the European Union, Euro-sceptic 
parties achieved major gains in the 2014 European elections, and have expanded their 
share of the vote in almost all regional and national elections held since. Seven national 
governments now either include or are tolerated by Euro-sceptic parties. In practice, 
however, their impact on the legislative process in the European Parliament and the 
Council has been minimal. But the crumbling of the European consensus limits the 
room for national governments to find compromises at the EU level, above all in rela-
tion to the Union’s major challenges. The EU therefore needs to secure its future on 
the basis of its existing level of integration. 
 
Scepticism towards European integration is 
by no means a new phenomenon. As early 
as in the 1980s parties like the French Front 
National won seats in the European Parlia-
ment (EP). But in recent years support for 
Euro-sceptic parties has expanded consider-
ably across Europe. Euro-scepticism, defined 
as rejection of existing and/or further EU 
integration, exists across the entire party-
political spectrum. The boundaries are 
often fluid in practice, resulting in often 
subjective criteria to classify parties as 
Euro-sceptic. The clearest approach is to 
use their membership of the political 
groups in the EP. There are currently four 
Euro-sceptic groups in the EP: 
The “moderate” Euro-sceptics of the Euro-
pean Conservatives and Reformists Group 
(ECR) are led by the British Conservative 
Party and the Polish Law and Justice Party 
(PiS). Both demand that powers be returned 
to the national level, but (largely) support 
remaining in the Union. Several members 
of the ECR belong to the political main-
stream in their home country. But in 2014 
the ECR also accepted parties that had 
hitherto been regarded as right-wing popu-
list, such as the Danish People’s Party. The 
Alternative for Germany (AfD) was part of 
the ECR until April 2016, when one of its 
two remaining MEPs was expelled from the 
group and the other left on her own accord 
following controversial remarks on refugee 
policy. 
Populist parties with strong anti-EU con-
victions form the second category. In the 
European Parliament they are organised in 
the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democ-
racy Group (EFDD). They include the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP) and the Italian 
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Five-Star Movement (M5S), and are charac-
terised by criticism of both national and 
European political elites, which they regard 
as having lost touch with ordinary citizens. 
One of the two remaining AfD MEPs also 
joined the EFDD in April 2016. 
The third Euro-sceptic group is the Europe 
of Nations and Freedom (ENF), which only 
formed in the course of the current legis-
lative period under the leadership of the 
French Front National. Its members – which 
include the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) 
and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) – 
are considerably more nationalist in their 
attitudes than the first two groups. For 
them, anti-migration policies generally 
play a greater role than Euro-scepticism, 
although in the refugee crisis they have 
increasingly been linking the two issues. 
Finally, there are openly extreme right-
wing parties like the German National-
demokratische Partei Deutschland (NPD) 
and the Greek Golden Dawn. Although they 
have to date been unable to find enough 
allies to form a group of their own in the 
European Parliament, they have organised 
themselves at the European level in the 
so-called Alliance for Peace and Freedom. 
As well as these four right-leaning 
groups, there are also populist parties at 
the left end of the political spectrum, such 
as the Greek Syriza. Although they tend 
to call for new economic policies in the 
EU/Eurozone, they do not fundamentally 
reject the Union. While these parties present 
their own distinct challenges to the EU, 
they are not the subject of the present 
analysis. Additionally, ostensibly pro-Euro-
pean mainstream groups also contain par-
ties that adopt Euro-sceptic positions in the 
national discourse, such as the Hungarian 
Fidesz which is part of the centre-right 
European People’s Party (EPP). 
Despite the broad spectrum they cover, 
Euro-sceptic parties long lacked the elec-
toral support required to give them power 
options of their own. That is changing 
rapidly now, given their recent growth at 
the European and national levels. What are 
the consequences for the EU? 
Euro-sceptics in the 
European Parliament 
For parties outside the political mainstream, 
European elections traditionally offer good 
opportunities, as they suffer low turnout 
and are still widely viewed as second order 
elections by voters. During the European 
elections in May 2014, moreover, the general 
mood of crisis allowed Euro-sceptic parties 
to record significant successes. Although 
their share of the vote did not increase 
everywhere, they gained support in many 
member states and came first in the United 
Kingdom (UKIP), France (Front National) 
and Denmark (Danish People’s Party). 
Overall, Euro-sceptic parties increased 
their representation from 121 seats (15.8 
percent) to 174 (23.2 percent), and thus now 
represent almost one quarter of all MEPs. 
The growth was shared relatively equally 
by the more moderate ECR (from 57 to 75 
seats) and the more fundamentalist EFDD 
(from 31 to 46), while the ENF (38 seats) 
only reached the requirements to form a 
group (25 MEPs from at least seven mem-
ber-states) in mid-2015 after persuading a 
number of members to switch their alle-
giance. 
Little Influence on Legislation 
Almost two years after the European elec-
tions the influence of Euro-sceptic parties 
on legislation in the European Parliament 
remains minimal. Three expectations have 
been confirmed. Firstly, the Euro-sceptics 
continue to be deeply divided, as reflected 
in their distribution among three different 
groups plus the non-aligned. The more 
radical Euro-sceptics of the EFDD and ENF 
in particular were unable to agree on col-
laboration. In fact, they actively fought over 
the support of individual MEPs, with the 
EFDD group collapsing briefly after a mem-
ber switched to the ENF in October 2014. It 
was only able to reconstitute after a Polish 
right-wing nationalist decided to join. 
At the same time, the parliamentary 
groups of fundamentalist Euro-sceptics 
represent no more than alliances of con-
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venience to secure group status. This is 
clearly reflected in their voting behaviour. 
The four mainstream groups in the Euro-
pean Parliament have each achieved co-
hesion exceeding 90 percent during the 
current legislative period. While the mod-
erate Euro-sceptics of the ECR manage 
almost 80 percent, the EFDD only records 
49 percent. Although the ENF scores 68 
percent, this is largely due to the domi-
nance of the Front National, which supplies 
20 of its 38 MEPs (all data on European Par-
liament voting from Vote Watch Europe). 
Secondly, the Euro-sceptic parties are 
largely excluded from coalition-building. 
Unlike in most national parliaments, the 
European Parliament does not (yet) have a 
government/opposition system; instead a 
separate majority must be found for each 
piece of legislation. This generally forms 
around a grand coalition of the EPP, the 
Socialists and Democrats (S&D) and the 
liberals (ALDE). During the current legis-
lative period each of these groups has been 
on the winning side in at least 87 percent 
of votes in the European Parliament. The 
EFDD and ENF, on the other hand, are set 
on fundamental opposition and found 
themselves voting with the majority in only 
30 percent of cases, mostly affecting gen-
eral issues. The behaviour of the moderate 
Euro-sceptics of the ECR varies. On institu-
tional matters they generally vote against 
further integration, but there is also com-
mon ground with the centre-right parties 
of the EPP, for example on economic policy 
and justice and home affairs. Altogether 
they voted with the majority 58 percent of 
the time. 
Thirdly, the Euro-sceptics participate 
only marginally in the parliamentary work, 
or are actively excluded by the mainstream 
parties. The most important legislative work 
in the European Parliament is done by the 
rapporteurs, who are appointed to prepare 
a report on a specific legislative proposal. 
They can potentially exert considerable 
influence on EU legislation, because they 
prepare the first drafts and conduct the 
negotiations with the Council and the Com-
mission. Leaving aside one Polish PiS MEP 
who has already prepared fifty reports – 
making him by far the most prolific in the 
entire Parliament – the 174 MEPs from the 
three Euro-sceptic groups account for just 
26 of the 378 reports to date, or less than 
7 percent. The radical Euro-sceptics from 
the ENF have yet to prepare a single report, 
whereas the moderates of the ECR have 
sometimes even been given responsibility 
for politically sensitive questions, such as 
the exchange of passenger name records 
with the United States. 
A comparable pattern can be found in 
appointments of committee chairs. They 
are appointed by their committees, with 
political agreements ensuring that each 
group receives posts on a proportionate 
basis. Yet the ECR has one chair fewer than 
the smaller ALDE group, while the main-
stream parties have declined to grant the 
EFDD and ENF a single chair or deputy 
chair – in clear contravention of the Parlia-
ment’s informal rules. 
Overall, the fundamentalist Euro-sceptics 
of ENF and EFDD possess little in the way of 
direct influence in the European Parliament, 
while the moderate ECR is at least partially 
integrated and participates more actively. 
Legitimising Presence  
Nonetheless, the large presence of Euro-
sceptics certainly does affect the work of 
the European Parliament. Firstly, despite 
their internal divisions they force the main-
stream groups to form a grand coalition 
because – unlike in the previous legislative 
period – there is no centre-left or centre-
right majority. As a result, the EPP and S&D 
now vote together more than 75 percent of 
the time. While there is no formal coalition 
agreement, cooperation between the two 
main groups has intensified significantly 
since they jointly elected Jean-Claude 
Juncker as President of the Commission. 
For the European public, that means that 
the mainstream parties in the European 
Parliament often appear indistinguishable, 
even where considerable differences do 
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actually exist on questions such as migra-
tion and economic policy. 
Secondly, the Euro-sceptics exploit their 
presence in the European Parliament for 
publicity and to gain legitimacy on the 
national stage. Group status is crucial, 
granting access to material and immaterial 
resources, such as staff or the parliamen-
tary stage for speeches. The heterogeneity 
is advantageous here, with each group re-
ceiving its own speaking time. Euro-sceptics 
are consequently especially strongly repre-
sented in high-profile debates. This has con-
sequences for the working atmosphere in 
Parliament, where the fundamental tenets 
of European integration are now called into 
question in almost every debate. 
How strongly the Euro-sceptics can profit 
from their presence in the European Parlia-
ment depends, however, on how they suc-
ceed in exploiting it in the media. Some of 
these parties have nominated less promi-
nent members for the European elections, 
who, once elected, largely disappeared from 
national media; this applies for example to 
“The Finns”, the Danish People’s Party and 
the FPÖ. The Front National and UKIP, by 
contrast, are represented in the European 
Parliament by their leaders Marine Le Pen 
and Nigel Farage – figures who already 
enjoy enormous media attention. Farage 
disseminates his parliamentary speeches 
widely on the internet, while Marine Le Pen 
used the additional legitimacy generated 
by her European election win to boost her 
media presence in France. 
National Adversaries of 
EU Consensus 
Building on their successes in the 2014 
European elections, Euro-sceptic have also 
made further gains at the national level, 
although to varying degrees. Since then 
there have been sixteen national parlia-
mentary elections in the EU’s member 
states. In five of them Euro-sceptics played 
no significant role (Belgium, Croatia, Ire-
land, Portugal, Spain) and in four others 
they stagnated or lost seats (Bulgaria, Fin-
land, Greece twice). But in seven they were 
able to make sometimes considerable in-
roads (Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, 
Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom). 
Especially in these latter cases, Euro-sceptic 
parties have also actively influenced the 
composition of governing coalitions; they 
are now involved in the formation of 
national government in seven member-
states (see Table 1). 
This represents a new quality of chal-
lenge for cooperation within the EU. Al-
though in the past there were sometimes 
governments that took a critical stance 
towards European integration, the Union 
had always been able to build on a per-
missive consensus, at least among the 
national elites. Seven states now represent 
a significant force, including the United 
Kingdom and Poland as two of the largest 
member-states. Factoring in left-wing gov-
ernments that reject the fundamental eco-
nomic policy priorities of the Eurozone/EU 
(Greece, Portugal, potentially Spain), one-
third of the EU is already accounted for. 
Beyond this there is also a grey zone of gov-
ernments composed of parties that nomi-
nally belong to pro-European mainstream 
groups but in fact pursue increasingly Euro-
sceptic policies, like Hungary under Prime 
Minister Viktor Orban (Fidesz/EPP). 
The overview highlights three aspects. 
Firstly, participation in government is 
largely restricted to the more moderate 
Euro-sceptics of the ECR. From the funda-
mentalist anti-EU forces of the EFDD, only 
the Lithuanian Order and Justice and the 
Slovak National Party are involved in coali-
tions, both as junior partner, whereas two 
parties from the ECR enjoy absolute major-
ities. This is above all because the ECR par-
ties tend to belong more to the mainstream 
in their respective countries or be accepted 
by the established parties. None of the mem-
bers of the ENF are involved in national 
government. 
Secondly, the rise of the Euro-sceptic 
parties is not limited to a particular set of 
EU countries. If the gains of the – generally 
more fundamentalist – Euro-sceptic parties 
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Table 1: Euro-sceptic parties involved in national government 
State Party EP group Last election Result (seats) Form of participation 
Denmark Danish People’s Party ECR  18 June 2015  21.1% (37/179) Toleration 
Finland The Finns ECR  19 April 2015  17.7% (38/200) Coalition partner 
Latvia National Alliance ECR  4 October 2014  16.6% (17/100) Coalition partner 
Lithuania Order and Justice EFDD  14 October 2012  7.3% (11/141) Coalition partner 
Poland Law and Justice  ECR  25 October 2015  37.6% (235/460) Absolute majority 
Slovakia Slovak National Party EFDD  5 March 2016  8.6% (15/150) Coalition partner 
United Kingdom Conservative Party ECR  7 May 2015  36.9% (330/650) Absolute majority 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
in regional elections in France (Front Natio-
nal), Austria (FPÖ), Germany (AfD) and the 
Netherlands (PVV) are included, their suc-
cesses are distributed throughout the Union, 
including its founding members. The only 
exception, paradoxically, are the southern 
crisis states of the Eurozone, where voters 
have gravitated more towards left-wing 
populists, but not strictly Euro-sceptic par-
ties like Syriza and Podemos. 
Thirdly, there are differences regarding 
the type of participation in government 
formation, and thus the political influence 
of the Euro-sceptic forces. Despite being 
the second-largest party in parliament, the 
Danish People’s Party decided only to toler-
ate a minority conservative-liberal govern-
ment, and therefore has no ministers who 
participate directly in EU Council meetings. 
The Euro-sceptic parties in Finland, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Slovakia are coalition part-
ners of mainstream parties. Of these, only 
“The Finns” control ministries of outstand-
ing relevance to the European Union (for-
eign affairs, defence, justice). The Polish PiS 
and the British Conservatives govern alone, 
are in full control of government policy and 
thus represent their country in all matters 
in the European Council and the Council of 
the EU. 
No Block-building, Few Blockades 
As outlined above, the Euro-sceptic parties 
in the European Parliament cannot block 
legislation on their own. That option is, 
however, open to them where they are 
represented in the Council of the EU as 
members of their national governments. 
Although the seven named governments 
cannot on their own muster a blocking 
minority in qualified majority voting in 
the Council, many important decisions in 
the Council are made by consensus, and the 
Union’s central organ, the European Coun-
cil, almost always makes its decisions un-
animously. Here every national government 
possesses a veto. 
In practice, however, there are so far 
no signs of a blockading policy at the Euro-
pean level. Instead, governments contain-
ing Euro-sceptic parties also participate 
in normal negotiations and compromise-
seeking at all levels in the Council. An 
analysis of public votes in the Council by 
national governments containing or toler-
ated by Euro-sceptic parties shows that the 
representatives from Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Poland have never voted against a legal act, 
in some cases in more than eighty votes. 
Denmark and Finland abstained once and 
twice respectively. Most governments con-
taining Euro-sceptic parties even went 
along with highly controversial decisions 
such as the relocation of 160,000 refugees – 
while certain governments comprising 
mainstream parties vehemently oppose it 
and rail against “orders from Brussels”. The 
only partial exception from the trend is 
the British government, which has already 
voted against three legal acts since May 
2015, and abstained on another four. But 
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out of forty-two votes, even that is still far 
from a blockade. 
Nor is Euro-sceptic block-building yet 
discernible at the European level. In cen-
tral questions of European policy, such as 
the refugee crisis, economic and monetary 
policy, or the British question, existing 
networks like the Visegrád Group or the 
close ties between Baltic and Scandinavian 
countries remain the decisive formats, even 
for governments with Euro-sceptic parties. 
In comparison to the EPP, S&D and ALDE 
groups, cooperation in the ECR, for example 
in advance of meetings of the European 
Council, has been very weak to date. The 
strongest signs of block-building are in fact 
found among the left-leaning governments 
of Greece, Portugal and potentially Spain, 
with their course against austerity policy in 
the Eurozone. However, as long as parties 
like Syriza and Podemos maintain their 
goal of reforming economic policy within 
the Eurozone framework, there is no over-
lap with the fundamentally Euro-sceptic 
parties of the EFDD or the ENF.  
That said, the governments containing 
Euro-sceptic parties have not completely 
knuckled down to the consensus. Having 
Euro-sceptic coalition partners can con-
siderably narrow a government’s leeway 
in talks in Brussels, especially on sensitive 
issues. During the difficult negotiations 
with Greece in summer 2015, for example, 
“The Finns” initially rejected a third pro-
gramme of financial assistance to Athens, 
and placed extremely narrow limits on the 
Finnish government’s negotiating mandate. 
Although Finland was not the only mem-
ber-state to regard further aid for Greece 
with scepticism, the Finnish government 
was among those with the smallest leeway 
after “The Finns” publicly threatened to 
leave the coalition if the result of the talks 
was a third Greek rescue package. Neverthe-
less, in the end the Finnish prime minister 
agreed to exactly that, and called the bluff 
of “The Finns”. Faced with the alternative 
of sacrificing their participation in govern-
ment, they decided to save the coalition 
and supported the package unanimously in 
the national parliament. But “The Finns” 
continue to categorically reject any deepen-
ing of the Eurozone, for example via a joint 
budget or transfers, as do mainstream par-
ties in other member-states. 
The Power of Referendums 
The long-term objective of the moderate 
Euro-sceptics is to repatriate powers to the 
national level and to restrict the European 
Union to primarily economic integration. 
Legally, the obstacles to a formal return of 
powers to the member-states are relatively 
high. Treaty amendments require the ap-
proval of all member-states and national 
ratification; revoking EU legislation requires 
at least a qualified majority in the Council 
and in most cases also the approval of the 
European Parliament. Both are obstacles 
that even the growing number of govern-
ments containing Euro-sceptic parties can-
not overcome on their own. 
A purely legalistic perspective falls short, 
however. The political dynamics in the 
EU, with two core projects – the euro and 
Schengen – in crisis at the same time, play 
into the hands of Euro-sceptic parties. That 
applies for example to Denmark, whose 
government held a referendum in Decem-
ber 2015 on whether the country should 
convert its categorical opt-out on justice 
and home affairs into an opt-in on the 
British model, in order to be able to con-
tinue to participate in that policy area 
(after changes laid out in the Lisbon Treaty 
came into effect following a five-year tran-
sition period). All the mainstream parties 
argued for the opt-in, while the Danish 
People’s Party campaigned for the opt-out. 
In opinion polls the pro-European side 
initially enjoyed a clear lead, but swayed 
by the refugee crisis the Danes eventually 
followed the People’s Party. This leaves 
Denmark de facto excluded from central 
aspects of EU cooperation in justice and 
home affairs, such as Europol. 
British Prime Minister David Cameron 
largely succeeded in winning his demands 
for changes to strengthen the national 
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level. When Cameron first outlined his 
goals in January 2013 he was still alone 
in the EU. Now, in order to keep the United 
Kingdom in the Union, the other member-
states have granted the UK concessions 
including exemption from the “ever-closer 
Union” and an “emergency brake” on ben-
efits for workers from EU countries. More 
fundamentally, there is growing substan-
tive support for the British demands, too. 
The new Danish government gave its clear 
backing to Cameron, and the Polish PiS gov-
ernment also supports his line – apart from 
the demand to deny benefits, which targets 
Polish migrant workers. Cameron hopes that 
these concessions will convince the British 
electorate to remain in the EU; a vote to 
leave would likely strengthen fundamen-
talist Euro-sceptics in other member-states. 
There are specific, separate reasons 
behind the successful renationalisation 
moves in the UK and Denmark. Yet it is no 
coincidence that both cases involve referen-
dums. Plebiscites are especially attractive to 
Euro-sceptics because they enable a mobili-
sation beyond the established parties, and 
create ideal conditions for a fight against 
“the Brussels elites” that can be used to 
advance an agenda of renationalisation 
against the EU consensus. The Greek refer-
endum of summer 2015 highlights the 
pitfalls of this strategy. Although the popu-
lation backed the Syriza government’s “no” 
to the reforms demanded by Brussels, in the 
end the EU partners pushed through their 
reforms by threatening to force Greece out 
of the Eurozone. This upheld the Eurozone’s 
policies despite the referendum, but further 
damaged the EU’s democratic credentials. 
Where the EU lacks such leverage, refer-
endums represent a powerful and now 
proven means of asserting national posi-
tions vis-à-vis the EU. That was the motiva-
tion behind Hungarian Prime Minister 
Orban’s February 2016 announcement of a 
referendum on the EU’s refugee relocation 
quotas. Here Orban is seeking popular 
support against what are actually legally 
binding EU decisions, in the interests of 
strengthening Hungarian sovereignty. 
Challenging the EU’s Core Values 
One of the greatest challenges to the 
Union’s already frayed cohesion arises 
when national governments come into 
conflict with its fundamental values. The 
treatment of Poland’s government is a 
textbook demonstration of how the EU, 
despite its emphasis on shared values, has 
yet to find a functioning mechanism to 
apply when member-states violate them. 
Immediately after taking office, the Polish 
government – with an absolute majority 
in parliament and the support of the Presi-
dent, who is also a member of PiS – pushed 
through a series of controversial reforms. 
One of the objectives was to massively 
tighten political control over the constitu-
tional court and the public media. This 
challenge to judicial and media independ-
ence clearly contradicts fundamental Euro-
pean values. 
In January 2016 the Commission re-
sponded by activating the rule of law mecha-
nism. Introduced following negative experi-
ences with Orban-governed Hungary, the 
mechanism represents a preliminary to 
sanctions that the EU can in principle apply 
in the event of a grave violation by one of 
its members. To date, however, the trajec-
tory in Poland mirrors that previously seen 
in Hungary. On the one hand, the process 
does the targeted government more good 
than harm domestically, because it appears 
to confirm the Euro-sceptics’ rhetoric against 
the Brussels elites. On the other, the threat 
of sanctions lacks credibility, because it 
would ultimately require a unanimous 
decision by the other member-states. Such 
a scenario is now politically virtually im-
possible, because Poland would be sup-
ported by governments with ECR partici-
pation and by Budapest. 
For the moment, government participa-
tion by Euro-sceptics is largely restricted to 
ECR parties. But the Polish example demon-
strates that the Union would have no answer 
if fundamentalist Euro-sceptics who radical-
ly reject the community’s values – like the 
Front National – were to form national gov-
ernments. 
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The End of the Elite Consensus 
In view of the participation of Euro-sceptics 
in the governments of seven member-states, 
it is time to accept that the erosion of the 
consensus over European integration has 
reached the political elites. In this situation, 
the EU and national policy-makers should 
make an objective assessment. 
Firstly, analysis of the EU’s decision-
making process shows that Euro-sceptic 
parties are unwilling or unable to pursue 
a hard blockade policy – neither indirectly 
through the Parliament nor directly through 
the Council. Moreover, internal differences 
have prevented them from forming a co-
hesive Euro-sceptic block in the European 
Parliament or the Council. The rise of Euro-
sceptic parties is a symptom rather than the 
source of the Union’s functional deficits. 
Secondly, Euro-scepticism is not only a 
position of the political extremes; to treat it 
as such and marginalise it in the European 
Parliament would in the longer term merely 
strengthen the Euro-sceptics’ argument 
that Brussels is going over the heads of the 
citizens. Additionally, the de facto grand 
coalition in the Parliament ensures that 
the positions of the mainstream parties 
are almost indistinguishable. Here a much 
stronger differentiation is required in the 
political debate with Euro-sceptic parties. 
Extreme right-wing parties like the Front 
National are becoming socially acceptable 
if they are the only forces offering alterna-
tives to established EU policies. And the EU 
would have no answer if such parties joined 
national governments. 
Thirdly, it must be accepted that there is 
no longer a majority for a further deepen-
ing of EU integration in a significant num-
ber of member states. Although govern-
ments including Euro-sceptic parties have 
transpired to be largely constructive in 
regular votes in the Council, they wield 
their full blocking potential when it comes 
to further integration steps, in particular 
through strategic referendums. With this 
phenomenon extending deep into the Euro-
zone, differentiated integration – which 
was still a possibility in the euro crisis – 
alone is not an option. Instead the EU’s 
political leaders need to resolve the current 
challenges on the basis of the existing level 
of integration, and in the process integrate 
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